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Protecting software from adversarial attacks is extremely important for DoD
technologies. When systems are compromised, the possibility exists for recovery cost-
ing millions of dollars and countless labor hours. Circuits implemented on embedded
systems utilizing FPGA technology are the result of downloading software for instan-
tiating circuits with specic functions or components. We consider the problem of
component hiding a form of software protection. Component identication is a well
studied problem. However, we use component identication as a metric for driving
the cost of reverse engineering to an unreasonable level.
We contribute to protection of software and circuitry by implementing a Java
based component identication tool. With this tool, we can characterize time re-
quired for carrying out adversarial attacks on unaltered boolean circuitry. To counter
component identication methods we utilize boundary blurring techniques which are
either semantic preserving or semantic changing in order to prevent component iden-
tication methods. Furthermore, we will show these techniques can drive adversarial
cost to unreasonable levels preventing compromise of critical systems.
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Today's military systems are complex systems composed of critical hardware andsoftware components. The DoD must take steps ensuring these technologies are
not easily compromised by an adversary's attempt to recover the function, construc-
tion or other embedded information contained within. Top down design results in
the abstraction of large circuits, or functions, into smaller subcircuits referred to as
components. If an adversary identies these components, it may lead them to the
overall circuit function [4]. Hiding components in a manner which drives up, to an
unreasonable level, the time and eort required for component identication is one
method possible for protecting critical U.S. military systems.
1.1 Problem Denition
The task of reverse engineering a system or product is not always completed
with malicious intent. When documentation used for sustaining large and complex
military systems becomes lost or damaged, reverse engineering becomes an acceptable
means for discovering the composition of the older system. However, this is not
always a reverse engineers' intent. In 2008, the Fiscal Year 2009 budget requested
$183.8 billion in modernization to meet future threats. This total included both
procurement, as well as research and development [11]. When an adversary reduces
this cost by reverse engineering a system, implementing protective measures becomes
extremely important.
Component identication is one method used by reverse engineers for discovering
key elements of a circuit. Nohl et al. used this technique revealing the cryptographic
1
cypher in the Mifare Classic Radio Frequency Identication (RFID) tag. They phys-
ically exposed the transistors in each layer of its silicon chip and grouped them into
gates performing logical functions such as the AND or XOR function. With computer
tools, identication of circuit gates was accomplished [9].
(a) Before automated template detection. (b) After automated template detection.
Figure 1.1: The results of exposing each layer of the silicon chip for identifying gate
level structure [9].
Because knowing gate level structure alone is not feasible for discovering a cir-
cuit's function, they began focusing their attention on grouping gates into identiable
cryptographic components. Knowing the circuitry contains a 48-bit register and a
number of XOR gates made locating the area of the chip containing the cryptographic
components possible [9]. Next, discovery of gate connections was accomplished us-
ing additional computer tools. Now, from the map of logic gates and connections
between them almost all needed information for discovering the cryptographic algo-
rithm is known [9].
The Dutch government invested about $2 billion in the use of this RFID tech-
nology for public transit system ticketing [13]. Discovering the cryptographic keys
makes it possible for attackers to access the transit system at no cost. Implementa-
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tion of hardware and software protection is extremely important for preventing these
types of attacks on U.S. critical technologies.
1.2 Goals and Hypothesis
The Mifare RFID example demonstrates how use of computer tools is important
to the component identication process. The student team identied logic gates and
connections between them from the silicon chip's discovered transistors using various
computer tools. This provided a complete picture of the internal circuitry, or white
box construction. Having knowledge of what components were necessary for the
cryptographic cipher allowed them to isolate the physical location of the cryptographic
circuitry. What happens when a reverse engineer has knowledge of a circuit's gate
level structure, but has no idea what its function is? How would an engineer go about
identifying internal components that compose a circuit? The rst research goal is
implementing a component identication tool for identifying known components of a
larger circuit. We will use this tool for performing an analysis on the eectiveness of
current component hiding techniques and gain insight in to the diculty an adversary
may have when attempting to discover circuit components in an unknown circuit. Can
this tool or similar tools be defeated by performing circuit transformations? What can
be done to hide components in plain sight? The second research goal is determining
a suitable transformation defeating this and possibly similar identication tools. To
answer these questions we use various combinational logic benchmark circuits. With
these tools and techniques in place we can increase circuit and software protection
levels preventing adversaries from gaining access to U.S. critical technologies.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II discusses current
methods and techniques used for discovering circuit components and ultimately an
unknown circuit function. Chapter III covers the methodology and analysis used for
this research. Chapter IV details the results of the identication tool implementation
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and component hiding algorithms. Chapter V summarizes the contributions of this
research and future works for improving the results. Appendix A provides a logic gate
legend for graphs used throughout this thesis. Appendix B provides additional details
of the module library and custom benchmark circuits used for the component iden-
tication tool. Appendix C contains identication time analysis gures. Appendix
D details creation of the custom benchmark circuits. Appendix E shows UML dia-
grams of Java classes created during this research and Appendix F provides a table
of circuits contained in the current module library.
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II. Literature Review
This chapter summarizes background material relevant to our research. Read-ers familiar with reverse engineering and obfuscation principles may omit this
chapter from their reading. We organize this chapter in the following manner. Sec-
tion 2.1 covers topics in reverse engineering. Section 2.2 provides a brief introduction
to obfuscation principles. Section 2.3 covers boolean circuits representing software
programs and additional information on our use of boolean circuits. Section 2.4 in-
troduces CORGI, a circuit obfuscation engine, and techniques used within. Section
2.5 covers techniques of component identication and Section 2.6 covers the ISCAS-85
benchmark circuits.
2.1 Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering is a systematic approach to gaining a basic understanding
of hardware or software systems and its structure when you have nothing more than
the system itself [12]. There are dierent reasons for reverse engineering, of which
one is creating the necessary documentation needed to aid in maintenance, strengthen
enhancement, or support replacement [1]. Determining how a product functions so
knowledge of the original systems purpose is gained is a second reason. In some
cases a device may contain partial cryptographic keys or algorithms for decoding and
decrypting information. Protecting these algorithms and keys prevents illegal access
to these pieces of information [2]. Reverse engineers perform dierent types of analysis
depending on the knowledge of their circuit of interest, either black box or white box.
2.1.1 Black Box Analysis. Black box analysis is a reverse engineering tech-
nique where nothing is known about the system of interest except the number of
circuit inputs and outputs, referred to as I/O space. In the case of logic circuits,
identifying the overall function requires enumerating all input combinations and mea-
suring the circuit output. This is an unavoidable step when dealing with low level
logic circuits consisting of truly random logic [4]. This is possible for small input
size. For example, circuit c17 from Figure 2.6 has only ve inputs. To enumerate all
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possible combinations would require only 25 = 32 dierent combinations. However,
for large circuit inputs this is a intractable task. For example, a simple 64-bit adder
with a carry-in pin has a total of 129 input pins and 65 output pins. If a reverse
engineer, with no prior knowledge of the circuit applies the inputs, it would take 2129
attempts or 299 seconds, roughly 2 1022 years, using a state-of-the-art one gigahertz
tester costing over $1 million [8].
2.1.2 White Box Analysis. When a reverse engineer knows the \construc-
tion", or internal structure, of a system the engineer performs white box analysis.
In software, a program's construction is the collection of language statements that
dene its topography [6]. With a circuit, this is in the form of a net list or other
descriptive le or the actual circuit schematic. Having this information available, the
reverse engineer has a combination of techniques they can employ. The two techniques
this research focuses on are the identication of library and repeated circuit modules
or components. Common components such as multiplexors, decoders, adders, and
CLA generators are found in IC manufacturer's databooks or cell libraries and in
textbooks [4]. Using these databooks identifying components of a circuit can lead
the engineer to discover the circuit's function. Repeated modules can also give away
information about a circuit. The c6288 16-bit multiplier is made up of 240 adder
components. Discovering a circuit's functions becomes more ecient for a reverse
engineer when regularity of the circuit structure is identied and exploited.
Hiding components in both a random and deterministic manner may force an
adversary to perform black box analysis which is impossible in instances discussed
in Section 2.1.1. Other eects of these techniques are introducing additional inputs,
outputs or both to a circuit changing its black box structure. Increasing the input
space will increase the time necessary to enumerate all input combinations therefore,
increase an adversary's time for discovering a circuit's function.
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2.2 Obfuscation
One defense against reverse engineering is obfuscation, a process that renders
software unintelligible but still functional. We accomplish this by transforming a
program into an equivalent variant harder to reverse engineer. Collberg states, given
a set of obfuscating transformation T = fT1; : : : ; Tng and a program P you can nd
a new program P 0 = Ti(P ) such that [2]:
 P 0 is sematic preserving.
 Obscurity of P 0 is maximized, i.e., the time to reverse engineer the program
increases.
 Resilience of P 0 is maximized, i.e., it will be dicult to create a tool to undo
the transformation or extremely time consuming.
 Stealth is maximized, i.e., the statistical properties of P 0 or similar to those of
the original program P .
 The time/space cost to create P 0 is minimized.
We apply obfuscation, using various techniques which we discuss later, to our circuits
of interest. Generally, we apply obfuscation transformation techniques in a way in
which the circuit semantics are left unchanged, white box obfuscation. However, if
we allow transformations to change the black box structure of the circuit and use a
recovery function to maintain the intended output, other possibilities exist [6]. Black
box transformations are an area of focus for this research eort.
2.3 Boolean Circuits Representing Programs
Today since more and more programs are distributed in easily decompilable
formats, rather than native binary code, it is increasingly important for us to consider
ways for protecting our programs. An example of a decompilable program is the Java
class le format [2]. Other programs we consider are those executed on hardware
processors such as Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA). Embedded systems
7
using FPGAs are able to realize circuits consisting of many dierent components.
Some of these include logic gates, controllers and arithmetic logic [8]. When studying
techniques for protecting software systems we need a method of expressing these
programs in a modiable form. We accomplish this through expressing programmatic
logic as combinatorial boolean circuits [10]. Since FPGAs realize boolean circuits
expressed by software programs, the terms software protection and circuit protection
are used interchangeably for the remainder of this thesis. Circuit protection is an
easier task than software protection. However, it still remains an extremely dicult
task.
2.3.1 Circuit Denition. A circuit is dened by the number of inputs,
outputs, intermediate gates and circuit basis. The circuit basis, 
, is a set of gates
a circuit may be composed of. For example, the set 
 = fAND, OR, NOR, NAND,
XOR, NXORg, having a basis size j
j = 6, is a complete six gate basis [6]. The
circuits utilized in this research use the basis set 
 = fAND, OR, NOR, NAND,
XOR, NXOR, NOT, BUFFERg with a size j
j = 8. A 5-2-6 circuit is a circuit
with ve inputs, two outputs and six intermediate gates. It is important to note
intermediate gates include output gates but not inputs in their total. Appendix A
provides a gate legend for referencing when viewing circuit graphs displayed in this
thesis.
2.3.2 Modeling a Boolean Circuit. A combinational logic circuit modeled
as a graph is easily analyzed. Since a combinational circuit has no loops and signal
ows from input to output, representing a circuit by Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)
is best. We now detail basic theory behind this modeling approach.
2.3.2.1 Basic Graph Theory. A graph G is a triple consisting of a
vertex set V (G), and an edge set E(G) and a relation that represents each edge with
its endpoints [14]. A vertex v 2 V (G) represents a gate or an input of the circuit
and an edge e 2 E(G) represents a wire of the circuit. For an edge or wire to be
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directed means ow can occur in only one direction. This is shown by a function
assigning each edge an ordered pair. The rst vertex in the ordered pair is the tail
and the second is the head. It is said that an edge goes from its tail to its head. This
terminology is taken from the arrows used to draw these kinds of graphs [14]. An edge
can also be indicated by listing the two vertices the edge connects for example, the
term uv simply means the edge between vertex u and vertex v. Arrows are omitted
from the circuit graphs, in this thesis, since all modeled circuits are combinational
logic circuits.
Figure 2.1: An example graph used to illustrate basic graph theory principles.
A path is a list of adjacent vertices that occur in order. Tracing the circuit ow
from one vertex to another would reveal a path between two vertices. A loop in a
graph is a single edge whose endpoints are the same. In the case of a logic gate, a
loop existing denes a wire from the output of a gate to the input of the same gate.
A cycle is a path beginning and ending at the same vertex and is dierent from a loop
since more than one edge denes a path.
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The graph in Figure 2.1 demonstrates basic graph theory principles. A path
p exists between vertex two and vertex eight and is dened by the list f2,5,6,7,8g.
This is valid in the combinational circuit graph. Vertex six has a loop and there also
exists a cycle dened by f5,6,7,5g. For a combinational circuit both loops and cycles
are illegal states. For this reason a DAG is used for modeling the combinational logic
circuit.
Denition - The neighborhood of a subgraph G, N(G), consists of all vertices v
adjacent to the v 2 G, but not contained in G [14].
Denition - The outdegree of a vertex v, is the number of edges with the tail v [14].
Denition - The indegree of a vertex v, is the number of edges with the head v [14].
2.4 Circuit Obfuscation via Randomization of Graphs Iteratively - CORGI
CORGI is a white box circuit obfuscation tool which takes a circuit and pro-
duces a semantically equivalent variant, meaning the circuit still has the same number
of inputs and outputs and performs the same logic function but has a dierent white
box structure [6]. In most cases CORGI produces a variant with an increased number
of gates. CORGI accomplishes this by selecting circuit gates based on various selec-
tion strategies. These strategies depend on circuit division into levels. For CORGI,
levels begin at the output with level zero and increase in value towards the input. A
predecessor of a gate at level n will belong to level n+1. Table 2.1 shows CORGI gate
selection strategies. Once a set of gates is selected, the subcircuit is dened (induced)
by the set of selected gates, as well as all connections (\wires") leading into or out of
those gates [6].
Input size, output size, and gate size denes a subcircuit selected by the selection
algorithm. A boolean six-tuple of circuit generation options is necessary for the library
generation algorithm. Each of these options, shown in table 2.2, inuences the number
of circuits produced for the selection library. After the selection library is generated,
a random choice is made and the subcircuit is replaced with a semantically equivalent
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Table 2.1: CORGI selection strategies [10].
Selection Algorithm Description
RandomSingleGate Selects a single gate at random
RandomTwoGates Selects two gates at random
RandomLevelTwoGates Selects a hierarchial level at random, and limits
replacement to two gates selected at random from
that level ( 1 level)
FixedLevelTwoGates Same as RandomLevelTwoGates except the hier-
archial level is specied
LargetLevelTwoGates Same as FixedLevelTwoGates except the hierar-
chial level is the one containing the most gates
OutputLevelTwoGates Same as FixedLevelTwoGates except the hierar-
chial level is 0
circuit. This process is repeated for a predetermined number of iterations producing
a nal circuit variant equivalent to the original circuit.
Table 2.2: Subcircuit replacement options utilized by CORGI [6].
Option Description
SymmetricGates Should a gate with input (X1; X2) be considered
equivalent to a gate with input (X2; X1)
RedundantGates Can a circuit have two such that the truth table
for each gate, based on all circuit inputs, be the
same
AllowConstants Should a circuit have immediate access to the con-
stants true and false
DoubleInputs Should the inputs to a gate be allowed to originate
in the same place
ExactCount Will the circuits being generated have an upper
bound on its size or will the circuit be exactly the
selected size
SimpleOutput When this is set to true, circuit outputs must all
be at the lowest level sinks in the circuit graph
2.4.1 Circuit Normalization. Redundant logic pathways are introduced by
the variant producing algorithms [7]. Removal of redundant signals and producing
a minimal sized semantically equivalent circuit is the purpose of the normalization
process. [7] developed a set of circuit normalization algorithms used during our ex-
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perimentation process. These algorithms aid in nal circuit variant production. Kim
implemented the following reduction patterns:
 Reduce Buer
 Reduce Inverter
 Reduce Inverter with Successor
XOR/XNOR
 Reduce Constant 0/1
 Reduce Constant 0/1 with Inverter
Inputs
 Reduce Two Gate to AND/-
NAND/OR/NOR
 Reduce Two Gates to Buer-
/NOT/Constant 0/1
 Reduce Two XOR/XNOR Gates to
Buer/NOT
 Reduce Gate with Opposite Inputs
 Reduce AND/OR/NAND/NOR
Gates with Inverter Inputs
 Reduce V pattern
 Reduce Diamond pattern
In the case of an obfuscated circuit, normalization may be one of the rst steps
an adversary takes to reduce the problem of reversing a circuit. By including this as
part of techniques introduced in this research, minimized circuit variants are produced
and analyzed allowing for a higher condence in the inability of reverse engineering
circuit variants.
2.5 Identifying Circuit Components
Circuit white box analysis can lead to a circuit's overall function. As discussed
in section 2.1.2, determining components of a circuit can expedite the process of un-
derstanding a circuit's overall function. Analyzing a circuit for candidate subcircuits
and then comparing each candidate against a library of known modules is the basis
of our component identication tool.
The problem of enumerating a circuit for candidate subcircuits is enormous.
After modeling the circuit of interest as a DAG, all candidate subgraphs are enumer-
ated. In a fully connected graph there is a possibility of n! subgraphs, where n is
the number of vertices in the graph. A completely connected combinational circuit is
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highly unlikely, but from this number it is possible to see an intractable number of
possible subcircuits may exist in a circuit. White et al. developed a candidate sub-
circuit enumeration algorithm that provides all the interesting gate clusters within a
target circuit [16]. This algorithm functions on three basic rules:
1. Unique Enumeration - No subgraph is created more than once.
2. Fully Specied Vertices - All vertices in a subgraph must be fully specied
or the subgraph is discarded.
3. Contained Vertices - All vertices in a subgraph must be contained or the
subgraph is discarded.
These rules are discussed in greater detail in Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2.
2.5.1 Unique Enumeration. Using an eective and ecient technique of
unique enumeration when identifying components is necessary because the size of
possible components in a circuit is extremely large. During component identication,
the rst step is ensuring only one creation path for each component is utilized [15].
The order vertices are added to a subgraph is its creation path. This path only allows
the addition of neighboring vertices with an index less than the subgraph index, the
index of the rst vertex in the path. These vertices compose the subgraph frontier.
Denition - The frontier of a subgraph G, F (G), consists of all vertices v such that
v 2 N(G) and the index of v is less than the index of the rst vertex in the creation
path [15].
The frontier contains expansion vertices. These vertices compose the reachable
frontier and are a subset of the frontier. In the trivial case of a single vertex the
frontier and reachable frontier are the same. Once the expansion of a graph begins
the two are no longer equivalent.
Denition - The reachable frontier of a subgraph G, FR(Gn), consists of all
vertices v that may be added to G such that v 2 F (Gn) and either (v 62 F (Gn 1)) or
(v 2 FR(Gn 1) and the index of v < the index last added to the creation path) [15].
13
Combining these together ensures a circuit graph is enumerated in such a way
every creation path is unique. Adding any vertex to a subgraph in its reachable
frontier satises rule one of the subcircuit enumeration algorithm.
Figure 2.2: Example of frontier and reachable frontier in the c17 circuit graph.
In Figure 2.2 the subgraph, H, with creation path fOut22,16,10g is circled
in red. The N(H) = fOut23; 11; In2; In3; In1g. Because the highest index of the
subgraph is Out22, the vertex Out23 is excluded from the frontier of the subgraph.
Vertex 11 is excluded from the reachable frontier because its index is greater than
the last vertex in the creation path. The remaining vertices, fIn1,In2,In3g are in the
reachable frontier.
2.5.2 Focused Enumeration. Even though a subgraph, H, is unique it is
not always an acceptable candidate subcircuit. An acceptable subcircuit meets two
conditions. Each v 2 H is fully specied and contained. A fully specied vertex has
either all of its predecessors or none of its predecessors in the subgraph. A contained
vertex is fully specied and joined within the subgraph by either all of its successors
or none of its successors. Only when these two conditions are met is a subgraph
considered a candidate subcircuit [15].
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Denition - In a subgraph H of a graph G, a vertex v 2 V (H) is a fully specied
vertex if (8uju 2 V (G) ^ uv 2 E(G)! u 2 V (H)) _ (8uju 2 V (G) ^ uv 2 E(G)!
u 62 V (H)) [15].
Denition - In a subgraph H of a graph G, a vertex v 2 V (H) is a contained
vertex if v is fully specied and ((8uju 2 V (G)^ uv 2 E(G)! u 2 V (H))_ (8uju 2
V (G) ^ uv 2 E(G)! u 62 V (H))) [15].
Rule two and rule three ensure these conditions are met. Rule two ensures every
v 2 V (H) is fully specied. When a vertex is added to a subgraph it is checked to
ensure this condition is satised. If it is not, and if the vertex required to satisfy this
condition is in FR(H), it is immediately added. If its not possible to add a vertex,
the subgraph is discarded as a candidate. Rule three ensures the circuit is contained.
Just as in rule two, as a vertex is added it is checked for containment. If any vertices
are needed and they are in FR(H), they are added immediately. Rule two and three
occur in a recursive manner until either a subgraph is created or discarded.
2.5.3 Series Versus Parallel Components. When the I/O space of a circuit
is within the realm of an adversary, there is a distinct dierence in the diculty of
hiding components in series versus components in parallel. Using black box tech-
niques, namely I/O enumeration, an adversary isolates the outputs that are driven by
particular inputs. This \leaks" information about the number of possible components
in a circuit and also helps create the gate clusters for further analysis. Discovering
series components is more dicult because I/O behavior does not reveal this relation-
ship. For example if the circuit in Figure 2.3 is a 6-4-25 circuit, an adversary, in just
64 steps, will know at least two components compose the circuit. The dependency
of component D becomes known and also components A, B, and C are considered a
single component. A permutation circuit is one method for preventing discovery of
circuit information.
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Figure 2.3: The four basic component cases in a circuit.
2.5.4 Permutation Circuit. The permutation circuit creates a one-to-one
and onto relationship between the input and output of the circuit. This type of cir-
cuit can encrypt circuit output containing parallel components in such a way that
adversarial black box analysis does not give away information regarding circuit com-
ponent structure. [5] shows parallel components sharing a circuit boundary are easily
identied using black box analysis. Figure 2.4 shows two parallel components in a
Figure 2.4: Two parallel circuit components, an AND gate and NAND gate.
16
circuit. The minimized circuit logic equations reveal this circuit is composed of two
individual components and shows the dependent inputs of each circuit output. Figure
Figure 2.5: Two parallel circuit components with 2-bit permutation circuit con-
nected to output.
2.5 shows results after attaching a two bit permutation circuit. Since F1 depends on
all four circuit inputs, the two components are not revealed by black box analysis.
When using permutation circuits the original circuit function is changed. However,
recovery is easy with a decryption circuit reversing the permutation.
2.6 ISCAS-85 Benchmarks
The ISCAS-85 benchmark circuits are industrial circuit designs. When origi-
nally introduced, only the netlist for these designs was made available both for con-
dentiality reasons and to allow them to be viewed as random logic circuits [4]. Hansen
et al. used these circuits to research high-level generation techniques and found the
ISCAS-85 circuits had well dened high level structures based on common logic cir-
cuit building blocks. Their reverse engineering techniques allowed them to recover
the functionality of the benchmark circuits and create high-level models [4]. These
models are now available to other researchers and are part of the foundation for our
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variant producing algorithms. Table 2.3 lists ten benchmark circuits and their basic
description.
Table 2.3: Circuits contained in the ISCAS-85 benchmark suite [4].
Circuit Function Inputs Outputs Gates
c432 27-channel interrupt controller 36 7 160
c499 32-bit SEC circuit 41 32 202
c880 8-bit ALU 60 26 383
c1355 32-bit SEC Circuit 41 32 546
c1908 16-bit SEC/DED circuit 33 25 880
c2670 12-bit ALU and controller 233 140 1,193
c3540 8-bit ALU 50 22 1,669
c5315 9-bit ALU 178 123 2,307
c6288 16-bit multiplier 32 32 2,406
c7552 32-but adder/comparator 207 108 3,512
2.6.1 BENCH File. For our research we primarily use the BENCH le for
textually representing boolean circuits. The c17 circuit is a simple 5-2-6 test circuit.
Figure 2.6(a) shows the BENCH le representation of c17.
The BENCH le provides an overview of the circuit. It shows the number
of inputs, outputs, inverters, and total number of gates contained in the circuit. A
synopsis of the gate types follows the total number of gates. Next, inputs and outputs
are listed with their corresponding gate identication number. Finally, all gates in the
circuit are listed along with their input gate identication numbers. Circuit objects are
constructed in CORGI while parsing the BENCH le. For example, NAND(10) has
input from INPUT(1) and INPUT(3) while OUTPUT(22) is a NAND gate receiving
input from NAND(10) and NAND(16).
2.6.2 c6288 - An ISCAS-85 Benchmark Circuit of Particular Interest. The
c6288 benchmark, 16-bit multiplier, represents a much larger gate-level circuit. Figure
2.7 shows how 2160 gates form 240 full and half adder cells, each with nine gates,
is arranged in a 15x16 matrix [3]. This circuit is of interest because of the number













10 = NAND(1, 3)
11 = NAND(3, 6)
19 = NAND(11, 7)
16 = NAND(2, 11)
22 = NAND(10, 16)
23 = NAND(16, 19)
(a) c17 BENCH File
(b) c17 Circuit
Figure 2.6: BENCH le and circuit schematic for the c17 benchmark circuit.
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each adder in the circuit. The top 15 half adders take on a conguration where the
two NOR gates labeled V are NOT gates and there is no carry in. The bottom half
adder takes on a conguration where the two NOR gates labeled W are NOT gates
and there is no carry out. These make up a total of 16 half adders in the circuit. The
remainder of the circuit is composed of 224 full adder components.
Figure 2.7: Matrix arrangement of the full and half adders of the c6288 16-bit
multiplier [3].
Figure 2.8: Topology of c6288 adders [3].
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III. Defeating Component Identication Using Boundary
Blurring
This research focuses on hiding circuit components increasing the cost of reverseengineering of critical technologies. Component identication algorithms exist
making component boundaries identiable [15]. Driving reverse engineering costs
to unreasonable levels may result from eectively hiding component boundaries in
larger circuits. Boundary blurring algorithms using both deterministic and random
measures obscuring component boundaries and forcing reverse engineers to rely on
other component identication methods is our research focus.
3.1 Problem Denition
When producing a circuit variant for reverse engineering protection, function
discovery time for an obfuscated circuit is one measure of success. Since component
identication enhances this process, measuring identication time answers several
questions about what level of obfuscation provides a reasonable amount of protection.
A second measure of success is the number of components identied within a circuit.
Determining the eectiveness of implemented obfuscation techniques and to what
extent each must be applied is possible when the number of circuit components is
known. White box variation will not hide all circuit information. However, it will
increase the cost of reversing a circuit by increasing complexity and reversing time.
Past research in software protection focuses on random circuit variants [6, 10], where
we turn our focus to more deterministic approaches.
Implementing a component identication tool for characterizing current obfus-
cation techniques is our rst research goal. When circuits have large I/O space a
reverse engineer will seek alternate means for discovering unknown circuit function.
Understanding the construction of a circuit, or its white box structure, is one such
method. Component identication gives an adversary insight into the construction
of an unknown circuit. When internal components are known understanding overall
circuit function becomes much easier. Boundary blurring is a deterministic technique
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which makes component boundaries less distinct causing identication algorithm fail-
ure. Figure 3.1 illustrates the basic boundary blurring concept. Realizing boundary
blurring algorithms for the purpose of understanding deterministic white box variants
is our second research goal. We target component boundaries for technique applica-
tion and measure component hiding eectiveness during this research.
(a) Two distinct components. (b) After blurring is applied, distinct bound-
aries no longer discoverable.
Figure 3.1: The basic idea behind boundary blurring concepts.
Our component identication tool is implemented in Java for use with the Cir-
cuit Obfuscation System (COS). White's subcircuit algorithm enumerates candidate
components which are compared to components in our known library. To verify iden-
tication time is a function of gate size, circuits of varying size are provided to the
component identication tool and components with varying size are compared for
equivalence while direct time measurement, in milliseconds, is made.
Two systems are utilized to achieve these research goals. The rst system, the
COS, is the base system we add boundary blurring algorithms to. We use these
additional algorithms for increasing COS performance. The second system is the
Component Identication System (CIS). We use this system to characterize the di-
22
culty of reverse engineering circuits and also measure obfuscation performance of the
COS. Our implementation of White's algorithm is the foundation of the CIS.
3.1.1 Circuit Components. A subcircuit is a component when combined
with all other subcircuits a higher level function is performed. The ISCAS-85 bench-
mark circuit c6288, is a 16 bit multiplier containing 240 individual components. The
components implement either half adder or full adder functionality. Components also
may conceal the functions of circuits. Using a permutation component, discussed
in Section 2.5.4, may encrypt and hide the output of two or more components in a
circuit. Unfortunately, if the component boundaries are not concealed, identication
is relatively straight forward.
3.1.2 Component Boundaries. There are nine possible component bound-
aries in large circuits. Figure 3.2 shows each possible case in a circuit P .
Figure 3.2: Boundaries considered for boundary blurring techniques.
 Component A - Input shared with circuit boundary and output shared with
other circuit components.
 Component B - Input and output shared with circuit components.
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 Component C - Input shared with circuit components and output shared with
circuit boundary.
 Component D - Input shared with circuit boundary and component; output
shared with circuit components.
 Component E - Input shared with circuit components and output shared with
circuit component and circuit boundary.
 Component F - Input and output shared with circuit boundary and component.
 Component G - Input shared with circuit boundary and output shared with
circuit boundary and another component.
 Component H - Input shared with circuit boundary and component; output
shared with circuit boundary.
 Component I - Input and output shared with circuit boundary only.
We implement two techniques for hiding component boundaries, the Multilevel
Blur and the Don't Care Blur. These are accomplished using dierent blurring selec-
tion strategies maximizing blurring within the circuit. The Multilevel Blur changes
the signature in a portion of the circuit. We recover the original signature at a spec-
ied blur level. Allowing recovery to occur outside of the original circuit requires
additional circuitry. The Don't Care Blur adds additional component inputs. When
using component identication tools an adversary could identify invalid components.
For example a three input two output full adder would become a four input two
output full adder. We discuss these techniques in greater detail in Section 4.1.
3.2 System Boundaries
Each system used in this research has a specic purpose. The COS produces
circuit variants aiding in protecting critical technologies. The CIS identies circuit
components, develops a measure of diculty for reverse engineering circuits and mea-
sures the COS obfuscation performance.
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3.2.1 Circuit Obfuscation System. The COS is composed of six primary
components. First, it contains the circuit model which represents the boolean logic
circuits it manipulates. Second, the system utilizes selection strategies facilitating ob-
fuscation methods. A circuit library component, the Component Under Test (CUT),
selects a replacement for the chosen subcircuit. The next two components of the sys-
tem are importers and exporters. These components read in or write out user selected
le types containing descriptions of manipulated circuits. Finally, the last component
of the system is the personal computer which executes Java code. Figure 3.3 provides
and overview of the COS.
Figure 3.3: Circuit Obfuscation System.
System workload consists of the combinational logic le chosen for obfuscation.
System parameters are composed of circuit library generation options controlling the
replacement circuit selected for insertion into the circuit. Table 3.1 shows current
selection strategies.
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Table 3.1: CORGI Selection Strategies [10]
Selection Algorithm Description
RandomSingleGate Selects a single gate at random
RandomTwoGates Selects two gates at random
RandomLevelTwoGates Selects a hierarchial level at random, and limits
replacement to two gates selected at random from
that level ( 1 level)
FixedLevelTwoGates Same as RandomLevelTwoGates except the hier-
archial level is specied
LargetLevelTwoGates Same as FixedLevelTwoGates except the hierar-
chial level is the one containing the most gates
OutputLevelTwoGates Same as FixedLevelTwoGates except the hierar-
chial level is 0
The COS has four system outputs, two metric and two response. System met-
rics include component hiding ability after application of obfuscation techniques and
the circuit variant production time. We measure hiding ability with the CIS, dis-
cussed in Section 3.2.2, and circuit variant production in minutes. System responses
include user selected logs and circuit description les. The COS has multiple log and
description les however, for the purposes of this research we categorize them as a
single system output.
3.2.2 Component Identication System. The CIS is a tool designed for
making reverse engineering of logic circuits an easier task and contains a personal
computer, the COS and our implementation of White's subcircuit enumeration algo-
rithm. The personal computer has no specic requirement other than the ability of
running Java-based programs. The COS passes the necessary circuit and component
objects to the CIS. The subcircuit enumeration algorithm provides candidate subcir-
cuits for comparison against a known component library. Any identied candidate is
written in BENCH and graphml le formats. Figure 3.4 provides an overview of the
CIS.
We use ten combinational logic circuits, the ISCAS-85 benchmark suite, as the
workload. System parameters include processor clock speed and subcircuit output
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limit. We limit gate count of identied candidates using a subcircuit size limit. This
gate count includes both intermediate gates and input gates. For example, a full
adder in c6288 has nine intermediate gates and three input gates making it a 12 gate
subcircuit. Larger candidate components slow identication time.
The CIS has six outputs, three metrics and three responses. System metrics
include candidate identication time, identication accuracy, and algorithm execution
time. We label the time, in milliseconds, from the beginning of component expansion
to the time candidate gate size is satised as candidate identication time. We also
save candidate circuits in BENCH and graphml formats. These les compose our
system responses. Total number of correctly identied circuit components measures
identication accuracy. For example, if all 240 adders (224 full adders and 16 half
adders) of the 16-bit multiplier are identied, the subcircuit algorithm is considered
100% accurate. We dene algorithm execution time as the time, in minutes, from the
start to nish of circuit searching. The log le containing data for each system metric
is the nal system response.
Figure 3.4: Component Identication System
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3.3 Component Obfuscation System Services
Creating circuit variants is the COS primary service. When the system is pro-
vided a BENCH le and variant options chosen, it produces semantically equivalent
circuits with modied white box structure. We measure the eectiveness of this ser-
vice using the CIS. The COS produces variants in an iterative manner and applies
further obfuscation with each iteration. We explore the number of iterations required
before components of a known circuit are no longer identiable.
When components are identied their boundaries (component inputs and out-
puts) become apparent. We add two blurring techniques to the COS, Multilevel Blur
and Don't Care Blur. Multilevel Blurring provides a downward blur in a circuit while
Don't Care Blurring provides a similar downward blur, but also allows connections
between an additional circuit gate and any other gate not creating a circuit loop.
These two techniques, along with dierent blurring selection strategies, create cir-
cuit variants defeating the CIS forcing the use of dierent circuit function discovery
techniques by reverse engineers.
3.4 Component Identication System Services
The CIS identies components in combinational logic circuits. Successful iden-
tication results in system responses of exported BENCH and graphml les, enabling
visual identication of components.
3.5 Workload
The COS workload consists of circuits described in BENCH le format. We
characterize CIS identication time using the ISCAS-85 benchmark circuits. The
primary parameter eecting subcircuit enumeration execution time is the number of
component gates. Because each logic gate is expanded into candidate subcircuits,
longer execution times result from larger circuits.
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Figure 3.5: Circuit composed of 3 c17 circuits. It is possible to see shared bound-
aries.
The CIS is supplied circuit variants as its workload. A search is conducted for
components identied before boundary blurring techniques are applied. The COS'
selection and replacement strategies and boundary blurring techniques will increase
circuit gate counts therefore, we expect an increase in search time for candidate iden-
tication. Completely eective blurring techniques prevent component identication.
3.6 Performance Metrics
The amount of production time and number of iterations required for circuit
variants are the performance metrics for the COS. Time is measured in minutes be-
ginning when the COS is started and ending when the circuit variant is produced. We
use the time measurement to verify the performance increase the boundary blurring
techniques provide. A boundary blurring iteration is a single attempt to apply either
the Multilevel or Don't Care blur.
CIS performance metrics include time necessary for identifying subcircuits, ac-
curacy of identication and overall search execution time. We measure component
identication time in milliseconds. This time starts when component expansion be-
gins and ends when component gate count is reached. The size based component
identication time is useful in two ways. First, it gives an indication of how large a
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circuit variant must be to slow down a reverse engineer using similar tools and sec-
ondly, it measures the subcircuit identier limits. Execution time is a similar metric.
We measure execution time in minutes starting when component identication begins
and ending when program execution stops. Knowing total execution time provides
an estimate of time required for reverse engineering even larger circuits.
Identication accuracy measures whether the algorithm can identify known com-
ponents in benchmark circuits. The 16-bit multiplier discussed in Section 2.6.2, has
240 individual adders. When all candidates are enumerated, we use additional heuris-
tics for equivalence checking. If these are not identied the algorithm is considered
inaccurate.
3.7 System Parameters
Three main parameters aect COS performance. With increased computer clock
speed, circuit variant production time is decreased. Selection strategy and replace-
ment circuit options also aect COS run time. These strategies and options are listed
in Table 2.1 and 2.2 respectively.
Two primary parameters aect CIS performance. First, is CPU clock speed.
Since subcircuit enumeration is a recursive expansion of subgraphs, increased proces-
sor speeds improve candidate identication. The subcircuit output limit aects sys-
tem performance. Because candidate expansion is recursive, larger subcircuit limits
increase subcircuit identication time. We identify the maximum practical subcircuit
output limit during our analysis.
Other system parameters aecting performance of both systems include size of
available memory, number of PC processors, type of operating system, and hard drive
speed. We do not analyze these parameters during this research.
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3.8 Factors
Factors are a subset of system parameters varied during performance measure-
ments. Each value a factor takes on is a level. We use specic factors and levels
for each system used in this research for obtaining our experimental goal. CIS ex-
perimental goal, is determining time for discovering components in a circuit by a
reverse engineer. COS experimental goal, is determining its eectiveness in hiding
components in a circuit.
3.8.1 Characterizing Component Identication System Candidate Identica-
tion Time. The size limit of the output component is the primary parameter
aecting performance. This limit controls how deep the identication algorithm's
recursive expansion goes. Once a candidate component is identied, it is saved and
the next gate is expanded based on specic enumeration rules. The circuit gate count
also eects the performance of the system. When large circuits are enumerated, just
as with the size limit of the output circuit, the recursive expansion goes much deeper.
Combining a large circuit and large component size produces expected run times of
hours and possibly days.
We expect an increase in identication as the output limit is increased, so the
levels and factors are chosen carefully. We expect quick execution with subcircuit
output limits below 25 gates. Once an output size of 25 is reached, especially in large
circuits, the time may increase to an unreasonable level. For this reason, subcircuit
size levels are three through 25, inclusive, and then steps of 15 until an output size
of 100 is reached. Workload factors are the ISCAS-85 benchmark circuits listed in
Table 2.3. These circuits represent a broad range of circuit sizes. Table 3.2 shows the
factors and levels of our analysis.
Practical component identication using our CIS, requires searching for com-
ponents in descending size order. We use output size limit levels to estimate time
required to search a circuit.
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Table 3.2: Factors and levels for characterizing component identication time of
the Component Identication System
Factor Level















3.8.2 Characterizing the Baseline Circuit Obfuscation System. Parameters
eecting the COS most are replacement options, selection strategies and number
of obfuscation iterations. There are six dierent replacement options, discussed in
Chapter II, utilized by the COS. These options form a six tuple providing 64 dierent
replacement options. From empirical studies, FFFTTT produces circuits most like
traditional VLSI circuit designs [6]. We use a random selection strategy where two
gates is replaced with three and two gates is replaced with four for our subcircuit
replacement. We determine how many iterations are performed by the initial circuit
size. Table 3.3 outlines factors and levels for characterizing COS performance before
the using boundary blurring techniques.
3.9 Evaluation Technique
We use direct measurement for evaluating the CIS. Measuring the identication
time of each candidate component at each size level determines system performance.
This is repeated for each workload circuit. We record subcircuit identication time
in milliseconds and complete execution time in minutes in the experiment log les.
Since components of each benchmark circuit is known, we determine identication ac-
curacy by comparing the candidate subcircuits to known subcircuits. This automated
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Table 3.3: Factors and Levels of the Circuit Obfuscation System Experiments
Factor Level











































process compares circuit semantics. We ensure the number of inputs and outputs are
equivalent as well as circuit function.
We analyze the COS using direct measurement and determine performance of
component hiding using the CIS. Circuit variants produced with each iteration level
are searched for known components. We expect variants with higher iteration levels
to have fewer components identied. After these measurements are made we apply
boundary blurring techniques and repeat the identication process.
3.10 Experimental Design
Full factorial experiments are used. We rst characterize CIS performance by
enumerating candidate components in each ISCAS-85 circuit. We show output size
levels for these experiments in Table 3.2. Next, component hiding experiments are ran
on variants of c6288 and three benchmark circuits of interest using factors and levels
in Table 3.3. This gives a baseline of eectiveness for current obfuscation techniques.
Finally, we use the CIS to measure hiding eectiveness of our boundary blurring
techniques. Factors and levels for blurring experiments are shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Factors and levels for boundary blurring experiments.
Factor Level












Implementing boundary blurring techniques to frustrate or prevent reverse en-
gineering is our primary research goal. Our second research goal is implementing
34
a component identication tool for measuring boundary blurring eectiveness. We
perform these measurements using methods outlined in this chapter. Circuits used
include the ISCAS-85 benchmark circuits and custom circuit types, one composed of
parallel and series components and another with very large I/O space. We will show
boundary blurring is an eective measure against reverse engineering.
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IV. Results
Hiding circuit components is a critical element of software and circuit protection.If an adversary can not identify circuit components they are forced to perform
other methods of analysis. Circuit boundaries become evident when component iden-
tication tools are used. Performing blurring algorithms on circuits in both random
and deterministic manners causing component identication algorithms to fail is a
counterneasure.
In this chapter, two boundary blurring algorithms are detailed. We explain
and present results for experiments measuring the current eectiveness of the Circuit
Obfuscation System (COS) and performance of the Component Identication Sys-
tem (CIS), both outlined in Chapter III. This chapter is divided into the following
sections. Section 4.1 details each of the boundary blurring algorithms, Section 4.2
describes our implementation of a component identication tool, Section 4.3 details
custom benchmark circuits created for this research, Section 4.4 provides provides
results of component identication tool performance, Section 4.5 discusses the cur-
rent eectiveness of the COS against component identication, Section 4.6 describes
experiments and results of the Multilevel Blur, Section 4.7 describes experiments and
results of the Don't Care Blur and Section 4.9 is a detailed analysis of candidate
component identication time.
4.1 Boundary Blurring Algorithms
We added two boundary blurring techniques, briey mentioned in Section 3.3,
along with blurring selection strategies to the variant producing algorithms already
implemented in the COS. We accomplished this using selection strategies both random
and deterministic in nature. Each strategy selects the replacement gate, replacement
gate type and blur level.
Denition - The multilevel blur replacement gate is the circuit gate having its gate
type changed during a single blur iteration. In the don't care blur, the replacement
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gate type is not changed. However, it will have a newly introduced gate connected to
its output.
Denition - The replacement type is the modied gate type of the replacement
gate when multilevel blurring is executed. In a don't care blur, this is the gate type of
the new gate connected to the replacement gate's output.
Denition - The blur level is the number of levels closer to the output of the circuit
at what point the modied signals in the circuit are recovered. Circuit outputs are level
zero.
Denition - A recovery gate is a gate at which modied signals in the circuit are
recovered. There may be one or many recovery gates for a single blurring iteration.
4.1.1 Blurring Selection Strategies. We utilized three primary blurring selec-
tion strategies for each blurring technique. These are a random strategy, max fan-out
strategy and identied boundary strategy. Each primary strategy has variations on
which elements are random or deterministic. We outline these below.
 SelectionMaximumFanOut - Selects all gates in a circuit that have maximum
out degree.
 SelectionMaximumFanOutReplaceType - Selects all gates in a circuit that have
maximum out degree and randomly selects the replacement gate type.
 SelectionMaximumFanOutReplaceTypeLevel - Selects all gates in a circuit that
have maximum out degree, randomly selects the replacement gate type and
randomly chooses the blur level.
 SelectionRandomReplacement - Randomly chooses the replacement gate in a
circuit.
 SelectionRandomReplacementReplaceType - Randomly chooses the replacement
gate and the replacement gate type.
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 SelectionRandomReplacementReplaceTypeLevel - Randomly chooses the replace-
ment gate, replacement gate type and the blur level.
 SelectionIdentiedBoundaryReplaceType - Randomly selects the replacement
type for the blur.
 SelectionIdentiedBoundaryReplaceTypeLevel - Randomly selects the replace-
ment type and blur level.
 SelectionIdentiedBoundaryRndPredecessorReplaceType - Randomly selects a
single predecessor gate of an identied boundary gate and randomly selects the
replacement type.
When gates with maximum fan-out include circuit input gates, the next smaller
fan-out is used. Circuit inputs are not used by our blurring algorithms.
4.1.2 Multilevel Boundary Blur. Initially, we implemented multilevel blur-
ring for component hiding. This blur is applied at a specic depth, or level, in the
circuit. Applying multilevel blurring requires selecting or specifying a replacement
gate. The replacement gate type is modied during the blurring process causing a
signal change in all gates succeeding it. The signals are recovered so the circuit remains
semantically equivalent. Recovery gates are the point where signals are recovered and
are identied by obtaining replacement gate successors down to the specied blur
level.
Figure 4.1 is a circuit with three blur levels labeled. We show the replacement
gate labeled G and the gates of each level below it labeled with their respective level.
When the gate type of G is modied, any gate in which a path exists between gate
G and itself is eected. We execute the following steps to recover the signals:
1. Determine the intermediate and recovery gates. An iterative loop is performed
a number of times equivalent to the blur level being performed. On the rst
iteration the successors of the replacement gate are obtained and on each suc-
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Figure 4.1: A level three blur circuit.
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cessive iteration the successors of those gates are obtained. The gates obtained
during the last iteration are labeled the recovery gates.
2. Determine the inputs needed to evaluate the original function, F0, and modied
function, F1. Each input of the replacement gate is added to the input list as
input A and input B therefore, a replacement gate must have an in-degree of
two. The remaining inputs are added by iterating over the intermediate and
recovery gates and adding, to the input list, any predecessor that is not in the
list of intermediate or recovery gates. The size of the input list equals n.
3. Create a working circuit to evaluate F0 and F1.
4. Generate an input bit list. This list is generated based upon the number of
inputs to the working circuit. There are 2n input values for a given circuit.
5. Evaluate F0 of the recovery gate.
6. Change the replacement gate type to its new type where

 = fAND;NAND;OR;NOR;XOR;XNORg.
7. Evaluate F1 of the recovery gate with the modied replacement gate.
8. Determine the bits in F0 that must be recovered. This is accomplished by
iterating through the F0 string. The index of each bit with value 1 is recorded.
9. Create a term list for performing a Quine-McCluskey sum of products (SOP)
reduction. This term list is produced by taking the input string and F1 value
for each index in step 8 and concatenating them together.
10. Perform the SOP reduction to create a reduced term list.
11. Disconnect the recovery gate from its successors and store them in a list of gates
to reconnect.
12. From the reduced term list nd inputs that are inverted and add necessary gates
to the original circuit. Store the inverted literals.
13. Create necessary AND and OR gate connections in the original circuit based
upon results from SOP reduction.
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14. Reconnect the SOP output to the appropriate reconnection gates from the re-
connect gate list.
Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show an example of simple level one blur on a 3-1-3
circuit where the output gate is a buer. Gate four is the replacement gate, whose
type is changed from an AND gate to an OR gate and gate ve is the recovery gate.
Index seven is the only term in F0 that must be recovered, as seen in Table 4.2.
Because only one term is recovered, no SOP reduction is required. The resulting
term used to recover the modied signal is f1 1 1 0g expressed by the logic function
ABCF 01.
Figure 4.2: A simple circuit in which a level one blur is applied and no SOP
reduction is required. Gate four, the replacement gate, is modied from an AND gate
to an OR gate, and gate ve is the recovery gate.
The second circuit, shown in Figure 4.5, requires a SOP reduction. In this case,
Table 4.2 shows there are three terms for reduction, f0 1 1 0, 1 0 1 1, 1 1 1 1g. Using
Quine-McCluskey reduction results in reduced terms f0 1 1 0, 1 X 1 1g. We interpret
the X in the second term as a don't care for input B. These reduced terms produce
the logic function A0BCF 01 + ACF1.
During a multilevel blur, working circuits with a large number of inputs may
result. This makes it possible for a high number of reduction terms. For this reason a
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Figure 4.3: Circuit of Figure 4.2 after the replacement gate type is changed.
Figure 4.4: The nal circuit after the replacement gate is modied and the original
signal, F0, is recovered.
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Table 4.1: Truth table for 3-1-3 circuits in Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. The original sig-
nal, F0, is modied to F1 when the replacement gate type is changed and is recovered
with SOP reduction as seen in function F2. Function F2 is equivalent to F0.
A B C F0 F1 F2
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 1
Figure 4.5: A simple circuit in which a level one blur is applied and a SOP reduction
is required. Gate four, the replacement gate, is modied from an OR gate to an AND
gate, and gate ve is the recovery gate.
Table 4.2: Truth table for the circuit shown in Figure 4.7. Function F2 is equivalent
to F1.
A B C F0 F1 F2
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1
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Figure 4.6: Circuit of Figure 4.5 after the replacement gate type is changed.
Figure 4.7: The nal circuit after the replacement gate is modied and the original
signal, F0, is recovered.
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limit of eight inputs is placed on the working circuit. When this input size is exceeded,
no blurring takes place for the current replacement gate.
4.1.3 Don't Care Boundary Blur. The Don't Care Blur introduces an addi-
tional input to a component or circuit changing its black box structure. This input
does not aect the component output. However, it will cause CIS failure. Primary
cause of failure is a newly introduced input. A random connection between the new
gate and another circuit gate forms a connection between two components in a circuit.
When the additional input is added at the circuit boundary the algorithm identies
a candidate component with a larger input size. An example of this is a full adder
with four inputs. This make no sense for a full adder component. The don't care
blur replacement gate has a new gate added directly to its output. The new gate's
remaining input allows creation of the new component input. The following steps are
executed during a Don't Care Blur:
1. Select the replacement gate.
2. Disconnect and store the replacement gate's successors in a reconnect gate list.
3. Select a recovery gate to connect to the output of the replacement gate where

 = fAND;NAND;OR;NOR;XOR;XNORg
4. Create a working circuit to evaluate F0 and F1.
5. Store the inputs of the replacement gate as input A and Input B.
6. Generate a list of input strings for a two bit input.
7. Evaluate F0, the output of the replacement gate, and expand F0 to 8 terms. See
Table 4.3 for expansion of F0.
8. Connect the recovery gate to the replacement gate output of the working circuit
and generate a new input list for a three bit input.
9. Evaluate F1, the output of the recovery gate.
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10. Determine the bits in F0 that must be recovered. This is accomplished by
iterating through the F0 string. The index of each bit with value one is recorded.
11. Create a term list for performing a Quine-McCluskey SOP reduction. This term
list is produced by taking the input string and F1 value for each index in step
the and concatenating them together.
12. Perform the SOP reduction to create a reduced term list.
13. From the reduced term list nd inputs that are inverted and add necessary gates
to the original circuit. Store the inverted literals.
14. Create necessary AND and OR gate connections in the original circuit based
upon results from SOP reduction.
15. Reconnect the SOP output to the appropriate reconnection gates in the recon-
nect gate list.
16. Randomly select a circuit gate and connect it to the additional input. The
selection must not create a circuit cycle.
Figure 4.8: A simple circuit before a don't care blur is performed. Gate four is the
replacement gate.
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Table 4.4: Function F0 and F1. F0 must be recovered from the output of F1.
A B D F0 F1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1
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Figure 4.9: A modied circuit resulting from a don't care blur. Gate four is the
replacement gate.
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Recovery terms for F0 are indices two through seven resulting in terms f0 1 0
0, 0 1 1 1, 1 0 0 0, 1 0 1 1, 1 1 0 0, 1 1 1 1g. After performing SOP reduction,
the reduced terms are fX 1 0 0, X 1 1 1, 1 X 0 0, 1 X 1 1g which produce logic
equation BD0F 01 + BDF1 + AD
0F 01 + ADF1. Figure 4.9 shows the modied circuit
after a Don't Care blur is performed with additional input D. Since the additional
input becomes a don't care input, we connect it to any gate not creating a circuit
cycle. The connection point is selected randomly during the blur process.
4.1.4 Additional Inputs and Outputs. Blurring techniques create additional
component inputs or outputs. When the multilevel blur is performed and both the
replacement and recovery gate are internal to the circuit, no additional inputs or
outputs result. However, when the recovery occurs outside the originating component,
additional outputs are added in the component containing the replacement gate and
additional inputs are added to the component containing the recovery gate. This
results from connections crossing component boundaries. The Don't Care blur only
adds an additional input to the component containing the replacement gate. These
changes aect the component's black box structure.
4.2 Implementing a Component Identication Tool
Reverse engineering a circuit using component identication techniques requires
the use of specialized computer tools. In this research, we explore the time an ad-
versary may take identifying components of an unknown circuit. We complete this
task by implementing a JAVA based component identication tool. The heart of the
identication tool is the CIS. However, the CIS only provides candidate subcircuits
of the larger circuit of interest. Since circuit composition is unknown, enumerating
candidate components of dierent sizes accomplishes the component search. Larger
components may contain smaller components so searching is conducted in decreasing
size order.
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It is necessary to check candidates for equivalence to known components. We
accomplish this by performing truth table analysis comparing the candidate com-
ponent and a known library component. This presents a problem for components
having a large I/O space. To overcome this, we realized a custom benchmark library
containing components with a maximum input and maximum output size of six.
Identication is a multi pass process. A single pass consists of identifying all
candidates in a circuit for each size in a size array or range. We perform equivalence
checks between candidate components and library components having the same I/O
space. When a match is found or all modules with the same I/O space are compared,
we terminate equivalence checking. We export BENCH and graphml les for each
matching component and after each pass is completed, gates from identied compo-
nents are removed reducing the size of the circuit for subsequent passes. We repeat
this process until no components are identied during a single pass.
4.2.1 Equivalence Checking. Truth table analysis mentioned in Section 4.2
is dependent on input and output order. Because of this dependency, we compare
all possible input and output combinations when checking for equivalence using truth
table methods. Given n inputs and m outputs, the total number of I/O permutations
necessary to conrm a candidate is equivalent is n!m!. A 6-4-x circuit requires 17,280
comparisons when a candidate is not equivalent. On the other hand, a 3-2-x circuit,
matching the I/O space of the full adder, takes only 12. Equivalence checking for the
candidate component terminates immediately when a positive match is made.
4.2.2 Circuit Reduction. After each enumeration pass, all identied com-
ponents are removed from the circuit under investigation. The possibility of shared
boundaries between two or more components prevents the removal of all subcircuit
gates. We remove all inputs without predecessor gates, all outputs without successor
gates and the remaining intermediate gates. Identifying all circuit components is not
always possible without identied component reduction.
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4.2.3 Component Library. A component library is necessary for comparing
candidate subcircuits discovered during subcircuit enumeration. The library is a
directory containing subdirectories labeled with the I/O space of the circuit. For
example, a directory labeled 4-3 contains module BENCH les of known four input
three output circuits. Because truth table analysis is used for equivalence checking,
the composition of a library circuit is not important. Constructing a BENCH le
with proper I/O space and output functions and placing it in the proper directory
enters a component into the library. Currently the module library contains 28 known
components shown in Appendix F.
4.3 Custom Benchmark Circuits
The c17 and c6288 benchmark circuits were instrumental in developing the
identication tool of Section 4.2, but the remaining ISCAS-85 benchmark circuits
presented certain obstacles, which we will discuss in Section 4.4. To overcome these
diculties, we created a custom component benchmark set. These circuits are shown
in Table 4.5. Input and output size of the custom benchmark circuits are chosen to
minimize I/O space and for producing larger circuits with known composition. Each
custom component performs a random function generated during creation. Each
circuit is created in the following way:
1. Choose the input and output size of the circuit.
2. Using RandomCircuitOutput.java, generate a random output for the circuit.
3. Synthesize the circuit using Logic Friday. This ensures a minimized implemen-
tation.
4. Using yEd Graph Editor, the Logic Friday synthesis is transcribed to graphml
format.
5. ConvertGraphMLToBenchAndShapedGraphML.java converts transcribed graphml
les to bench les and updated graphml formats.
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Table 4.5: Custom bench les created for this research and component identication
tool development.
Circuit Name Inputs Outputs Gates Component Size
c2215 2 2 13 15
c237 2 3 5 7
c249 2 4 7 9
c3211 3 2 8 11
c3418 3 4 15 18
c3516 3 5 13 16
c3622 3 6 19 22
c4222 4 2 18 22
c4327 4 3 23 27
c4440 4 4 36 40
c5241 5 2 36 41
c5355 5 3 50 55
c5479 5 4 74 79
c6276 6 2 70 76
c63103 6 3 97 103
c64145 6 4 139 145
Appendix D shows the process of creating a simple three input two output circuit. It
is worth noting, Logic Friday will synthesize an inverter as a NAND gate with a single
input connected to a logic one or either a NOR gate with a single input connected to
a logic zero. When this occurs, inverter gates are placed in the transcribed graphml
le. Custom components are shown in Appendix B.
4.4 Component Identication Tool Performance
Our component identication tool does not identify all ISCAS-85 benchmark
circuit components. These circuits were our target for tool testing. However, since we
are unable to identify all components, custom benchmark circuits were created. The
cause of these failures result from dependent components, those with shared inputs
or gates, in the circuit under investigation. Success was obtained with circuit c17,
c6288 and the remaining custom circuits.
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4.4.1 Problems Identied in Circuit c432. Circuit c432 identied weaknesses
of our component identication tool. Splitting shared inputs into single inputs and
disabling rule three of candidate enumeration allows visual identication of module
one. However, the shared inverter gates between module two and module three pre-
vents identication of remaining components. Success with c6288 and failures with
modules one, two and three in c432 prompted further investigation of independent
circuit components. Figure 2.7 shows how c6288 is composed of independent adder
components.
Circuit c3633, shown in Figure 4.10, is a simple circuit composed of three com-
ponents demonstrating components with shared inputs. When provided as the circuit
under investigation only component c3418 is identied. Figure 4.11 shows both re-
maining components after reduction occurs. Input gates 1005, 1006 and 1007 are in-
puts to removed component c3418. Subcircuit enumeration rule three and the shared
input, In1001, cause identication failure.
Figure 4.10: Circuit c3633 high level diagram showing three component composition
and sharing of input between component c3211 and c249.
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Figure 4.11: Circuit graph of remaining two components in c3633 after component
identication.
4.4.2 Initial Component Identication. Before using the custom benchmark
components to construct larger circuits, we input each to the identication tool as
a circuit under investigation. This ensured our tool will identify each benchmark
circuit. We conducted a search for components equivalent in size of circuit under
investigation. The identication tool identies all custom benchmark circuits and
c17. Average execution time after ve identication experiments is shown in Table
4.6.
4.4.3 Initial Benchmark Circuit Testing. Circuit c6288 is the only ISCAS-
85 benchmark where all components are identied. We constructed larger benchmark
circuits for further exploring the identication tool. We used Circuits c182449 and
c212352 for initial testing. These circuits represent circuits composed of multiple
independent components. Circuit c182449 has 218 = 262144 input combinations while
c212352 has 221 = 2:097106 input combinations. Circuit c3315555 is a 12 component
circuit containing all 9 of the component boundary types identied in Figure 3.2.
The circuit has 233 = 8:59 109 input combinations. The nal circuit created during
this research is c70281374. This circuit has 70 inputs, 28 outputs and contains 26
components. The total number of input combinations is 270 = 1:18X1021 and would
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Table 4.6: Mean and median identication time for individual component identi-
cation using component identication tool.


















take 3:74  103 years to enumerate using state-of-the-art testers. An adversary is
forced to use white box analysis on such circuits. High level diagrams of c182449,
c212352, c3315555 and c70281374 are shown in Figure 4.13, 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 and
gate level diagrams are contained in Appendix B. We targeted each component size
in initial identication tests using a size array, to decrease search times. Execution
time for searches in unknown circuits or circuits with obfuscation take longer. The
results of the initial component identication are shown in table 4.7 and experiment
design is shown in Figure 4.12.
4.5 Circuit Obfuscation System Performance
We determine the ability for the COS to hide circuit components by using the
identication tool on variants of the original circuit. We conducted our search using
an appropriate search range and results of variants outlined in Table 3.3. All circuit
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Figure 4.12: CIS experiment design. We provide individual components and bench-
mark circuits to the CIS recording identication time and number of components
identied.
Table 4.7: Mean initial identication times for custom benchmark circuits.
Circuit Components Search Set Passes Mean Identica-
tion Time (min)












Figure 4.13: Circuit c182449 high level diagram.
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Figure 4.14: Circuit c212352 high level diagram.
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Figure 4.15: Circuit c3315555 high level diagram.
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Figure 4.16: Circuit c70281374 high level diagram.
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variants created are normalized before providing them to the component identication
tool. Figure 4.17 details COS experimental design.
Figure 4.17: COS experiment design. We record identication time and number of
components identied for random and deterministic variants.
4.5.1 c6288 Three Gate Replacement. Originally, c6288 contains 2448 gates
and is composed of 240 adder components. After normalization, 3000 iterations pro-
duced the largest circuit with an increase of 22 gates and also most eective hiding
with 19, or 7.9%, of components hidden. Increasing the number of iterations may
increase hiding, but empirical evidence shows normalization after three gate replace-
ment results in an almost unchanges circuit. Table 4.8 shows size of circuit variants
and number of components identied by the component identication tool.
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Figure 4.18: c6288 variant with most eective hiding.
Table 4.8: Size of c6288 variants and number of components identied.
Iterations Replacement Size New Size Comp. Identied Search Time (min)
1000 3 2458 229 1.21
1500 3 2458 230 1.31
2000 3 2456 233 1.25
2500 3 2467 226 1.39
3000 3 2470 221 1.39
4.5.2 c10448 Three Gate Replacement. Originally, c10448 contains 58 gates
and is composed of three components. After normalization, 125 iterations produced
the largest circuit with an increase of 30 gates. However, after 75 iterations 100%
component hiding was achieved. Table 4.9 shows size of circuit variants and number
of components identied by the component identication tool.
Table 4.9: Size of c10448 variants and number of components identied.
Iterations Replacement Size New Size Comp. Identied Search Time (min)
25 3 71 2 1.72
50 3 76 1 3.66
75 3 84 0 2.32
100 3 87 0 2.55
125 3 88 0 3.23
4.5.3 c3315555 Three Gate Replacement. Originally, c3315555 contains 588
gates and is composed of 12 components. This circuit is signicant to this research
because it contains components covering all nine component boundary cases. Table
4.10 shows size of circuit variants and number of components identied by the com-
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Figure 4.19: c10448 variant with most eective hiding.
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ponent identication tool. In each case, the c6276 circuit covering component case
I is identied. After normalization 625 iterations produced a circuit equivalent to
Figure 4.20: c3315555 variant with most eective hiding.
Table 4.10: Size of c3315555 variants and number of components identied.
Iterations Replacement Size New Size Comp. Identied Search Time (min)
250 3 576 4 639.18
375 3 581 3 1026.67
500 3 579 1 1601.63
625 3 588 4 2085.51
750 3 582 5 1257.49
the size of the original. All other iterations resulted in reduced circuit sizes from
normalization removing output buers.
4.5.4 c70281374 Three Gate Replacement. Originally, c70281374 contains
1374 gates and is composed of 26 components. This circuit contains all nine com-
ponent boundary cases and has an input size preventing enumeration of all possible
input combinations forcing an adversary to perform white box analysis. Table 4.11
shows the results of COS performance tests. The c6276 circuit covering component
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case I is identied in all but the 1250 iteration variant. A circuit merge occurred
resulting in no identication of the case I component.
Table 4.11: Size of c70281374 variants and number of components identied.
Iterations Replacement Size New Size Comp. Identied Search Time (min)
500 3 1336 7 2056.35
750 3 1337 7 2021.88
1000 3 1340 12 2672
1250 3 1346 6 2049.53
1500 3 1351 6 2317.89
4.5.5 c6288 Four Gate Replacement. After three obfuscation cycles, the
circuit variant contains 5789 gates an increase of 136% from the original circuit. We
conducted component identication with a size search range of 11 to 50 gates and only
four components were identied. Execution time for a single pass of the component
identication tool was 2080 minutes.
Figure 4.21: c6288 four gate replacement variant.
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4.5.6 c10448 Four Gate Replacement. After two obfuscation cycles for each
iteration size, the largest variant was produced with 75 selection and replacements.
The circuit increased from 48 to 204 gates, a 325% increase. We conducted component
identication searches with a search range of 11 to 100 gates. Table 4.12 shows COS
performance test results.
Table 4.12: Size of c10448 variants and number of components identied.
Iterations Replacement Size New Size Comp. Identied Search Time (min)
25 4 151 0 20.21
50 4 150 0 23.21
75 4 204 0 48.49
4.5.7 c3315555 Four Gate Replacement. After two obfuscation cycles for
each iteration size, the largest variant was produced with 375 selections and replace-
ments. The circuit increased from 555 to 1442 gates, a 160% increase. We attempted
component identication searches with a search range of nine to 175 gates. We ter-
minated component identication after 78 hours of execution due to excessive search
time. When execution was terminated, the search for components in the 250 iteration
variant had decreased to component sizes of 151 gates and in the 375 iteration cir-
cuit component search size decreased to 168 gates. Table 4.13 shows results of COS
performance tests.
Table 4.13: Size of c3315555 variants and number of components identied.
Iterations Replacement Size New Size Comp. Identied Termination Time (min)
250 4 1132 0 4714
375 4 1442 0 4710
4.5.8 c70281374 Four Gate Replacement. After two obfuscation cycles, the
produced circuit variant contains 2496 gates an increase of 91% from the original
circuit. We conducted component identication with a size search range of 11 to 200
gates. We terminated component identication after 78 hours of execution due to
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Figure 4.22: c10448 variant with most eective hiding.
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Figure 4.23: c3315555 variant produced from 375 obfuscation iterations.
excessive search time. When execution was terminated component search size had
decreased to components composed of 198 gates.
4.6 Multilevel Blur Experiments
We performed Multilevel blur experiments using selection strategies outlined in
Table 3.4. For all experiments the initial blur level is level three and reduces when
a blur attempt fails. Blurring on a specic replacement gate is terminated once a
successful blur is achieved or once failed attempts occur on levels one, two and three.
The number of blurs attempted is compared with the number of iterations performed
with the COS.
4.6.1 c6288 Blurring Results. Applying Multilevel Blurring using the iden-
tied boundary blurring experiment has no eect on c6288. Circuit topology prevents
any blurring using this strategy. With max fan-out strategy a total of 463 successful
multilevel blurs occur. In our experiment an OR gate was chosen as the random
replacement gate type, the circuit increased to 11382 gates and 100% component hid-
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Figure 4.24: c70281374 variant produced from 500 obfuscation iterations.
ing is achieved. Figure 4.25 shows the resulting gate level diagram of the identied
boundary experiment and Figure 4.26 shows the circuit variant after the max fan-out
strategy is executed.
Figure 4.25: c6288 after apllication of identied boundary multilevel blurring. No
changes are made to the circuit.
4.6.2 c10448 Blurring Results. Performing multilevel blurring on identied
boundaries results in eight identied boundaries and four successful blurs. Of the
four blurs, three are level one and the remaining blur is level two producing a circuit
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Figure 4.26: c6288 after application of max fan-out multilevel blurring.
with 337 gates or 480% larger. Figure 4.27 shows the circuit produced. Searching the
circuit variant for components results in no identied components.
Figure 4.27: c10448 after application of identied boundary multilevel blurring.
4.6.3 c3315555 Blurring Results. Initially the circuit under investigation
contains 588 gates. After we apply multilevel blurring the circuit variant contains
1187 gates, an increase of 101.9% increase. From the 36 identied boundary gates,
11 were successfully blurred. Figure 4.28 shows the circuit before blurring is applied
and Figure 4.29 shows the results of the 11 successes. In these circuit representations,
it is possible to see multilevel blurring does not merge disconnected circuits. When
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the variant is provided to the component identication tool, zero components are
identied.
Figure 4.28: Circuit c3315555 before application of boundary blurring.
Max fan-out results in four gates identied for blurring. Multilevel blurring is
successful for all four gates and proved successful in defeating the component iden-
tication tool. When the circuit variant is provided to the component identication
tool zero components were identied.
4.6.4 c70281374 Blurring Results. There are 78 identied boundaries in
c70181374. When applying multilevel blurring, 17 boundary gates are successfully
blurred. This increased the circuit's size from 1374 to 2401 gates, a 74.7% increase.
Attempting to identify components in the circuit variant was not successful. We
terminated component identication due to extremely slow progress. At least one
component should have been identied since multilevel blurring did not merge the
71
Figure 4.29: Circuit c3315555 after application of multilevel boundary blurring.
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Figure 4.30: Organic view of c70281374.
case I component with the rest of the circuit. Figures 4.30 and 4.31 show c70281304
before and after blurring.
Max fan-out resulted in three identied gates and three successful blurs. The
circuit variant size increased only 3.5% with 17 identied components.
4.7 Don't Care Blur Experiments
We performed Don't Care blur experiments using the identied boundary blur
experiments. Boundaries of identied components are recorded and a Don't Care blur
is performed on each boundary gate. The replacement gate is selected randomly as
discussed in Section 4.1.3. The number of blurs successfully attempted is compared
with the number of iterations performed with the COS.
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Figure 4.31: c70281374 after identied boundary multilevel blurring.
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4.7.1 c6288 Blurring Results. There are 480 identied boundary gates in
c6288. This number results from two output gates on each of 240 components. All 480
gates were successfully blurred using Don't Care blurring, increasing the circuit's gate
size from 2448 to 7052 gates, a 188% increase. Performing component identication
on the blurred circuit results in 100% component hiding. Organic circuit graphs are
shown in Figure 4.32 and 4.33.
Figure 4.32: Organic layout of c6288 before application of boundary blurring.
4.7.2 c10448 Blurring Results. There are eight identied boundary gates in
c10448. Each of the c17 circuits contribute two boundary gates and four gates from
the four bit permutation circuit. Blurring was only successful on each c17 output
gate increasing the circuit in size from 58 to 121 gates, a 108% increase. Component
hiding, in this case, was not 100% eective. The 4-bit permutation circuit was still
identiable. However, the two c17 circuits were not. Random connection of the
additional don't care input created a merge between the two c17 circuits. Figure
4.34 shows the results after boundary blurring is applied and Figure 4.35 shows the
remaining circuit after identication is ran on the blurred circuit.
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Figure 4.33: Organic layout of c6288 after application of don't care boundary blur-
ring.
4.7.3 c3315555 Blurring Results. There are 36 identied boundary gates
in c3315555, where each boundary gate is a component output gate. When applying
blurring to each boundary gate, 19 of 36 are blurred successfully increasing circuit
size by 28.5% from 588 to 822 gates. Providing the blurred circuit to the component
identication tool, as the circuit under investigation, resulted in 100% component
hiding. This circuit highlighted additional properties of the Don't Care blur. In Figure
4.36, it is possible to see ten distinct circuit components. Component number ten is
the case I component which causes the circuit graph to be seen as two disconnected
graphs. Figure 4.37 shows the circuit graph after blurring is applied. The internal
components are not as easily identied and the circuit graph has been merged into a
single circuit.
4.7.4 c70281374 Blurring Results. There are 78 identied boundaries in
c70281374 circuit. When applying Don't Care blurring, 40 boundary gates were
successfully blurred. This increased the circuit's size from 1374 to 1859 gates, a
35.3% increase. As with multilevel blurring, we terminated component identication
due to slow progress. However, the case I component is merged with the remaining
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Figure 4.34: Circuit c10448 after application of identied boundary blur.
Figure 4.35: Remaining c17 circuits merged as a result of the Don't Care blur.
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Figure 4.36: Circuit c3315555 before boundary blurring is applied. Individual
components are relatively easy to identify using organic graph representation.
Figure 4.37: Circuit c3315555 after application of don't care boundary blurring.
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circuit as a result of the random connections of don't care inputs. Figure 4.38 shows
blurring results.
Figure 4.38: Circuit c70281374 after application of don't dare boundary blurring.
4.8 Variant Production Time vs. Components Identied
Producing circuit variants with current selection and replacement strategies is a
very time consuming task. The average time to create a circuit variant using a random
two gate selection and three gate replacement was 120.5 minutes and the median
was 23 minutes. Performing a random two gate selection and four gate replacement
averaged 440.43 minutes with a median of 243 minutes. Using blurring strategies for
variant production of our benchmark circuits takes less than 50.58 minutes of which
40.58 minutes is time required to perform boundary identication. With knowledge
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Table 4.14: Average times, in minutes, to produce circuit variants.
Circuit Sel. 2 Rep. 3 Sel. 2 Rep. 4 Multilevel Don't Care
c6288 391.6 243 6.5 4
c10448 < 2 75.3 < 1 < 1
c3315555 10.6 708 < 1 < 1
c70281374 76.8 1198 < 1 < 1
Table 4.15: Number of components identied in circuit variants.
Circuit Sel. 2 Rep. 3 Sel. 2 Rep. 4 Multilevel Don't Care
c6288 227.8 4 0 0
c10448 .6 0 0 1
c3315555 3.4 0 1 0
c70281374 7.6 0 0 0
of the circuit boundaries blurring requires ten minutes or less. Table 4.14 provides
detailed performance times and Table 4.15 shows the number of components identied
by the component identication tool.
4.9 Analysis of Candidate Component Identication Time
To characterize the time required for component identication, candidate sub-
circuits of the ten ISCAS-85 circuits were enumerated. The candidate sizes are listed
in Table 3.4. During the identication process, we logged the identication time of
each candidate. As expected, when circuit size increased, identication time also
increased. Figure 4.39 shows the average enumeration time after ve rounds of can-
didate subcircuit identication.
To understand candidate subcircuit identication time, a histogram for all iden-
tication times was created. log10(time) was plotted for easier visualization. Figure
4.40 is a histogram of identication times. A total of 465500 measurements were
logged during candidate enumeration. The data shows expansion time for each cir-
cuit gate and not all expansions produce a candidate circuit. If at any point during
the recursive expansion of the identication algorithm rule two or rule three can not
be satised the subgraph is discarded. However, the measurement is logged. The
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Figure 4.39: The average time required to enumerate all levels of candidate subcir-
cuits in minutes. The graph shows circuit size versus time to enumerate all candidates.
median identication time is 2.312ms and the mean is 61.594ms. These time are only
valid for characterization levels. We provide individual histograms for each circuit in
Appendix C.
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This chapter discusses research contributions and future works for improving toolimplementations.
5.1 Goals and Hypothesis
Because component identication provides a faster way of understanding a cir-
cuit, it is an important part of reverse engineering. However, component identication
requires knowledge of a circuit's structure. The component identication tool along
with a known component library will successfully identify components in larger cir-
cuits. This tool is most successful when circuits are composed of independent circuit
components. Implementing additional identication heuristics will improve compo-
nent identication in other circuits. Boundary blurring algorithms are an eective
means of defeating the foundational enumeration algorithm of the identication tool
and it is assumed these types of methods will defeat other identication tools.
5.2 Contributions
5.2.1 Multilevel Blurring. Multilevel blurring is a subcircuit replacement
algorithm that defeats component identication. It is important since it shows the
possibility exists for changing signals within a circuit and recovering them either
internal or external to the original circuit boundary. If the assumption that other
component identication tools use similar enumeration techniques is made, this blur-
ring strategy is useful in increasing the time an adversary would spend discovering a
circuit's unknown functionality.
5.2.2 Don't Care Blurring. Don't Care blurring is a second blurring algo-
rithm which defeats component identication. This algorithm introduces additional
inputs to a circuit component or entire circuit depending on its implementation. Just
with multilevel blurring, if we assume other tools identify components using similar
algorithms, this method of blurring will delay an adversary in determining a circuit's
intended purpose.
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5.2.3 Component Identication Tool. Component identication is possible
on circuits constructed of independent circuit components. Candidate components
are enumerated from circuits of interest and compared to a library of known compo-
nents. Functions of circuits with large I/O space, which must be reversed by white box
methods, are discovered and it is possible to estimate the time and eort necessary
to complete these tasks. We use this tool for measuring eectiveness of circuit pro-
tection and with additional development this tool will become a signicant Program
Encryption Group tool.
5.2.4 BENCH File Creation Tool. Creating circuits by hand for the Circuit
Obfuscation System (COS) is a tedious process. Initial circuit creation can take hours
and is prone to error. With this tool, a simple graph is constructed using proper gate
shapes and analyzed by the tool. The result is BENCH and shaped graphml les of
the newly constructed circuit.
5.2.5 Shaped Graphml Graphs. Graphml les exported with shapes and
colors representing specic gate types improves visual analysis of circuit graphs. When
analyzing boundary blurring algorithms it is possible to visualize where clusters of
new gates are added in circuit variants.
5.3 Future Works
5.3.1 Validate Implementation of Subcircuit Enumeration. The subcircuit
enumeration algorithm used by the component identication tool needs validation.
Collaborating with others using this algorithm or having an independent expert ana-
lyze the implementation is necessary. Applying subcircuit enumeration unmodied to
a circuit being reversed engineered is not feasible however, this does not preclude the
use of the techniques in practical application [15]. Through our component identica-
tion tool implementation discovery of useful algorithms were made. Performing oper-
ations such as input splitting or renumbering gate indices may increase the robustness
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of the tool. These algorithms were partially implemented during tool development
and require further application research.
5.3.2 Component Equivalence Checking. Candidate component equivalence
is determined using truth table analysis. This is feasible only for circuits with small
I/O space. Truth table analysis fails when trying to compare module one of c432 which
is an 18 input component. Using other equivalence methods such as reduced order
binary decision diagrams will make it possible to analyze components with larger I/O
space. Improved equivalence checking is necessary for improving the identication
tool.
5.3.3 Working with Module Library in Memory. When candidates match
input and output size of a known library module, the known component is imported
for analysis. Each module is stored in BENCH le format in a directory labeled
by the I/O space of the circuit. In a circuit such as c6288, 240 circuit imports
occur. Working with library modules in memory, by importing them at the start of
component identication, would improve the performance of the identication tool
and reduce system I/O operations.
5.3.4 Error Checking in BENCH File Tool. Time required to produce
circuit BENCH les from scratch is signicantly reduced using this tool. However,
complete error checking is not implemented. A user may design a circuit and make
gate connection errors. The BENCH le and graph les are produced, but execution
errors occur when the COS or CIS attempts to utilize them. Error checking must be
explored and implemented to make this a more robust tool.
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Appendix A. Gate Legend
This appendix outlines shapes and colors used for identifying specic gates typesin circuit graphs used throughout this thesis.













Appendix B. Custom Circuit Gate Level Diagrams
This appendix shows 16 custom components created for developing our compo-nent identication tool and testing boundary blurring algorithms. These cir-
cuits were created using the process outlined in Section 4.3. We also include custom
circuits composed from our component modules.
Figure B.1: Benchmark Circuit c2215
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Figure B.2: Benchmark Circuit c237
Figure B.3: Benchmark Circuit c249
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Figure B.4: Benchmark Circuit c3211
89
Figure B.5: Benchmark Circuit c3418
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Figure B.6: Benchmark Circuit c3516
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Figure B.7: Benchmark Circuit c3622
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Figure B.8: Benchmark Circuit c4221
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Figure B.9: Benchmark Circuit c4327
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Figure B.10: Benchmark Circuit c4440
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Figure B.11: Benchmark Circuit c5241
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Figure B.12: Benchmark Circuit c5355
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Figure B.13: Benchmark Circuit c5479
Figure B.14: Benchmark Circuit c6276
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Figure B.15: Benchmark Circuit c63103
Figure B.16: Benchmark Circuit c64145
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Figure B.17: Benchmark Circuit c182449
Figure B.18: Benchmark Circuit c212235
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Figure B.19: Benchmark Circuit c3315555
Figure B.20: Benchmark Circuit c70281374
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Appendix C. Histograms of Candidate Component Identication Time
This appendix shows histograms of identication times for each ISCAS-85 circuit.The histograms include expansion time for every vertex while attempting to
identify components of sizes specied in Table 3.2.
Figure C.1: Candidate identication times for circuit c1355.
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Figure C.2: Candidate identication times for circuit c1908.
Figure C.3: Candidate identication times for circuit c2670.
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Figure C.4: Candidate identication times for circuit c3540.
Figure C.5: Candidate identication times for circuit c432.
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Figure C.6: Candidate identication times for circuit c499.
Figure C.7: Candidate identication times for circuit c5315.
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Figure C.8: Candidate identication times for circuit c6288.
Figure C.9: Candidate identication times for circuit c7552.
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Figure C.10: Candidate identication times for circuit c880.
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Appendix D. Custom Bench Files and Their Generation
This appendix shows results of the generation process for a three input fouroutput custom bench le. We outline the process in Section 4.3.
Figure D.1: Output of RandomCircuitOutput.java with three inputs and four out-
puts specied.
Figure D.2: Synthesized circuit after entering the results of the random circuit
output into Logic Friday.
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Figure D.3: Results of Logic Friday transcribed into yEd Graph Editor.




















# Bench file generated from yEd .graphml file.
Figure D.5: Bench le produced from ConvertGraphMLToBenchAndShaped-
GraphML.java execution.
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Appendix E. UML Diagrams
This appendix contains UML diagrams for software we developed during ourresearch. Class les were added to the Program Encryption Toolkit (PET) for
purposes of exploring component identication and hiding. Empty classes in larger
diagrams are detailed individually later in this appendix. Complete PET dependencies
are not shown.
Figure E.1: Component Identication Tool class diagram.
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Figure E.2: SemanticComponentIdentierExperiment class diagram.
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Figure E.3: NumberOfComponentsBySize class diagram.
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Figure E.4: ComponentIdentier class diagram.
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Figure E.5: SubEnumeration class diagram.
Figure E.6: TruthTableComparator class diagram.
Figure E.7: ComponentExperiment class diagram.
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Figure E.8: IdentiedBoundaryBlur class diagram.
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Figure E.9: MaxFanOutBlur class diagram.
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Figure E.10: RandomGateBlur class diagram.
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Figure E.11: Boundary selection strategies class diagram.
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Appendix F. Identication Tool Module Library Circuits
This appendix lists BENCH les included in the known component library whichalso includes the custom bench les listed in Appendix B
Table F.1: Circuits contained in the module library and their I/O space.
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